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Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Ekström, Mathias - 2018

The paper reports the first experimental study on people’s fairness views on extreme income inequalities arising from … winner-take-all reward structures. We find that the majority of participants consider extreme income inequality generated in …” fairness argument for no redistribution: the winner deserves all the earnings because these earnings were determined by his or …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872102

Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Wolfstetter, … - 2001

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310347

More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature

Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin G. - 2013

Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323022

Social preferences in the lab: A comparison of students and a representative population

Cappelen, Alexander W.; Nygaard, Knut; Sørensen, Erik Ø. - 2011

Can lab experiments on student populations serve to identify the motivational forces present in society at large? We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277397

Who Cares When Value (Mis)Reporting May Be Found Out? An Acquiring-a-Company Experiment with Value Messages and Information Leaks

Di Cagno, Daniela; Güth, Werner; Lohse, Tim; Marazzi, … - 2023

We modify the Acquiring-a-Company game to study lying in ultimatum bargaining. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to potential buyers. Via random information leaks, buyers can learn the true value before proposing a price which the seller finally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014377381

Free to Fail? Paternalistic Preferences in the United States

Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hermes, Henning; … - 2023

We study paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the general population in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014377416

Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions: Experimental evidence

Burda, Michael C.; Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - 1998

One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don't employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an alternative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010309895

Auctions and fair division games under different price rules: Individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010309999

Learning to bid: An experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games

Güth, Werner; Ivanova, Radosveta; Königstein, Manfred; … - 1999

We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants face these four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to examine whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310061

Experimental 'beauty contests' with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria

Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - 2001

We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310366