Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
Publisher:	Berlin : Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Subject:	Experiments \| Sealed Bid Auctions \| Asymmetric Bidders \| Private-Independent Values

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Series:	SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; 2001,15
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	72394704X [GVK] hdl:10419/62694 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200115 [RePEc]
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310347