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The positive economics of labor market rigidities and investor protection

Fehn, Rainer; Meier, Carsten-Patrick - 2001

This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a sustantial protection of insiders on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316080

On the Evolution of Market Institutions : The Platform Design Paradox

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Walzl, Markus - 2021

We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether efficient platforms, leading to market - clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317023

What explains the rise in CEO pay in Germany? A panel data analysis for 1977-2009

Fabbri, Francesca; Marin, Dalia - 2012

The compensation of executive board members in Germany has become a highly controversial topic since Vodafone's hostile … unique panel data evidence of the 500 largest firms in Germany in the period 1977-2009 we test two prominent hypothesis in … manager power hypothesis for Germany as executives tend to be rewarded when the sector is doing well rather than the firm they …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281035

How weak is the weakest-link principle? : On the measurement of firm owners' control rights

Weichenrieder, Alfons J.; Edwards, Jeremy S. S. - 2004

The paper argues that the weakest link principle, which has been widely used as a measure of ultimate owners? control rights, has a number of serious problems. A theoretically more satisfactory method of measuring control rights, based on voting power indices, is proposed, and the different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261241

Optimal delegation when the large shareholder has multiple tasks

Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2010

We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270637

Voting in corporate boards with heterogeneous preferences

Balduzzi, Paolo; Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2011

We analyze the voting behavior of a board of directors that has to approve (or reject) an investment proposal with uncertain return. We consider three types of directors: insiders, who are biased toward acceptance of the project, independent outsiders who want to maximize the firm's profit and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274882

Ownership concentration, monitoring and optimal board structure

Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2005

The paper analyzes the optimal structure of the board of directors in a firm with a large shareholder sitting on the board. In a one-tier structure the sole board performs all tasks, while in a two-tier structure the management board is in charge of project selection and the supervisory board is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261334

Subprime crisis and board (in-)competence : private vs. public banks in Germany

Hau, Harald; Thum, Marcel - 2009

We examine evidence for a systematic underperformance of Germany's state-owned banks in the current financial crisis …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276835

Ownership and control in a competitive industry

Karle, Heiko; Klein, Tobias J.; Stahl, Konrad O. - 2011

We study a differentiated product market in which an investor initially owns a controlling stake in one of two competing firms and may acquire a non-controlling or a controlling stake in a competitor, either directly using her own assets, or indirectly via the controlled firm. While industry...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274862

Managerial hedging and portfolio monitoring

Bisin, Alberto; Gottardi, Piero; Rampini, Adriano A. - 2004

Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the agency problem between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261074

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