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What explains the rise in CEO pay in Germany? A panel data analysis for 1977-2009
Fabbri, Francesca; Marin, Dalia - 2012
The compensation of executive board members in Germany has become a highly controversial topic since Vodafone's hostile … unique panel data evidence of the 500 largest firms in Germany in the period 1977-2009 we test two prominent hypothesis in … manager power hypothesis for Germany as executives tend to be rewarded when the sector is doing well rather than the firm they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281035
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How weak is the weakest-link principle? : On the measurement of firm owners' control rights
Weichenrieder, Alfons J.; Edwards, Jeremy S. S. - 2004
The paper argues that the weakest link principle, which has been widely used as a measure of ultimate owners? control rights, has a number of serious problems. A theoretically more satisfactory method of measuring control rights, based on voting power indices, is proposed, and the different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261241
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Subprime crisis and board (in-)competence : private vs. public banks in Germany
Hau, Harald; Thum, Marcel - 2009
We examine evidence for a systematic underperformance of Germany's state-owned banks in the current financial crisis …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276835
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Learning from the past: trends in executive compensation over the twentieth century
Frydman, Carola - 2008
In recent years, a large academic debate has tried to explain the rapid rise in CEO pay experienced over the past three decades. In this article, I review the main proposed theories, which span views of compensation as the result of a competitive labor market for executives to theories based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264485
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Optimal delegation when the large shareholder has multiple tasks
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2010
We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270637
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Corporate governance reforms, interlocking directorship networks and company value in Italy (1998-2007)
Drago, Carlo; Millo, Francesco; Ricciuti, Roberto; … - 2011
In this paper we contribute to the literature on the structure of interlocking directorship networks and to the literature on the relationship between corporate governance and performance. We use a unique dataset made of corporate governance variables related to the board size and interlocking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274726
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Voting in corporate boards with heterogeneous preferences
Balduzzi, Paolo; Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2011
We analyze the voting behavior of a board of directors that has to approve (or reject) an investment proposal with uncertain return. We consider three types of directors: insiders, who are biased toward acceptance of the project, independent outsiders who want to maximize the firm's profit and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274882
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Rhineland exit?
Bovenberg, Lans; Teulings, Coen N. - 2008
We argue in favor of the shareholder model of the firm for three main reasons. First, serving multiple stakeholders leads to ill-defined property rights. What sounds like a fair compromise between stakeholders can easily evolve in a permanent struggle about the ultimate goal of the company....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276828
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The positive economics of labor market rigidities and investor protection
Fehn, Rainer; Meier, Carsten-Patrick - 2001
This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a sustantial protection of insiders on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316080
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Ownership concentration, monitoring and optimal board structure
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2005
The paper analyzes the optimal structure of the board of directors in a firm with a large shareholder sitting on the board. In a one-tier structure the sole board performs all tasks, while in a two-tier structure the management board is in charge of project selection and the supervisory board is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261334