In this paper we model the commercial lobbying industry (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D ….C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups commercial lobbying firms are not directly motivated by policy outcomes … level of commercial lobbying services is typically socially inefficient, and characterize the nature of the distortions …

private firm. We solve analytically for the Kantian equilibrium of this lobbying game together with the majority voting … more concentrated among the top productivity individuals, their increased lobbying effort generates efficiency as well as …

create doubt about scientific information, we use a signaling model of interest-group lobbying in which the policymaker has … persuasion to imply that the NGO may be a radical extremist whose lobbying is not credible. The second involves the creation of a …

lobbying, because now decisions are too sensitive to the preferences of the organised group. …

economic theory of lobbying that exercise provides our empirical investigation with theoretical foundations. …

Using a model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real-world lobbying industry …. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where … analytical structure allows us to explain several trends in lobbying. For example, using the observation that in the U.S. over …

How can the West’s economic and political polarization be explained? We argue that persuasive lobbying at various …-term lobbying infrastructure investments in a simpli_ed tax-and-spend model, the deviations between majority desires and implemented …

just signaling for active involvement in lobbying action, since we find evidence that actual meeting attendance has a …