information’ assumption. The ad value is characterized by a tractable analytical solution given observed auction parameters. Using … Yahoo! search auction data, we estimate value distributions and study the bidding behavior across product categories. We …

This paper proposes a framework for demand estimation with data on bids, bidders' identities, and auction covariates … dynamic auction model with IPV and private bidding costs it follows that if participation is optimal the bidder searches with … a reservation bid for low-price auctions. Extending results from the empirical auction literature and employing a …

We study the relative performance of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction and the second-price sealed‐bid auction in a … reveals the winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first‐price sealed‐bid auction in which the winner …’s payment is revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue and efficiency. Our findings may have implications …

information' assumption. The ad value is characterized by a tractable analytical solution given observed auction parameters. Using … Yahoo! search auction data, we estimate value distributions and study the bidding behavior across product categories. We …

This paper proposes a framework for demand estimation with data on bids, bidders' identities, and auction covariates … dynamic auction model with IPV and private bidding costs it follows that if participation is optimal the bidder searches with … a reservation bid for low-price auctions. Extending results from the empirical auction literature and employing a …

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential …

. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer … exists in the second-price auction and the English auction. We establish there is no equivalence between these two auction … clock, affects signaling incentives differently in both auction formats, and thereby also the bidders’ incentives to overbid …