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How weak is the weakest-link principle? : On the measurement of firm owners' control rights

Weichenrieder, Alfons J.; Edwards, Jeremy S. S. - 2004

The paper argues that the weakest link principle, which has been widely used as a measure of ultimate owners? control rights, has a number of serious problems. A theoretically more satisfactory method of measuring control rights, based on voting power indices, is proposed, and the different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261241

Rhineland exit?

Bovenberg, Lans; Teulings, Coen N. - 2008

difficulties. While society reaps long-run gains in efficiency, in the short run a generation of insiders has to give up their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276828

Politics-Business Co-evolution Paths : Workers’ Organization and Capitalist Concentration

Belloc, Marianna - 2012

Most pre-crisis explanations of the various corporate governance systems have considered the separation between ownership and control to be an advantage of the Anglo-American economies. They have also attributed the failure of other countries to achieve these efficient arrangements to their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116042

Politics-business interaction paths

Belloc, Marianna; Pagano, Ugo - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266039

Market Competition or Family Ties: Which Prevails on Italian CEOs Pay?

Graziano, Clara; Rondi, Laura - 2015

The paper analyzes the interplay of product market competition and governance on CEO compensation in Italian listed firms from 2000 to 2011 and tests the impact of the 2007-08 financial crisis on pay-performance sensitivity. We argue that important differences both in the level of compensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011307062

Efficiency of European Universities : A Comparison of Peers

Herberholz, Lars - 2020

efficiency of 450 European universities between 2011 and 2014. The novelty of our approach lies in its extended coverage of …. Exploring potential efficiency drivers, we uncover considerable effect heterogeneity between subject clusters, which is … seek external funding are largely identified to be primary efficiency drivers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842974

Efficient Level of Seps Licensing

Langus, Gregor; Lipatov, Vilen - 2022

We study the question whether a holder of standard essential patents (SEPs) should be allowed to choose the level in the value chain at which to offer a FRAND license to its SEPs. We give a pos-itive answer to this question for two reasons. First, the SEP holder and the social planner tend to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013300871

The positive economics of labor market rigidities and investor protection

Fehn, Rainer; Meier, Carsten-Patrick - 2001

This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a sustantial protection of insiders on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316080

Ownership concentration, monitoring and optimal board structure

Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2005

The paper analyzes the optimal structure of the board of directors in a firm with a large shareholder sitting on the board. In a one-tier structure the sole board performs all tasks, while in a two-tier structure the management board is in charge of project selection and the supervisory board is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261334

Optimal delegation when the large shareholder has multiple tasks

Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2010

We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270637