Showing 1 - 10 of 492
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game …) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273875
policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … all members of the IEA. In the strong delegation game principals first delegate to agents, which then decide on membership … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314772
We investigate the dimensions through which R&D spillovers are propagated across firms via cooperation through Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). We build on the framework developed by Bloom et al. (2013) which considers the opposing effects of technology spillovers and product market rivalry, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824822
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352382
In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how … of the prize often takes place after the coalition formation stage. This creates the possibility for some players to ask … strategic disadvantage: a greater voting power in forming a winning coalition is undermined by the threat of being overly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013235112
coalition formation among three countries in order to examine the endogenous strategic considerations in the creation and … enlargement of international unions. Why would we observe a gradualist approach in the formation of the grand coalition even if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316888
This paper defines the concept of feedback Kant-Nash equilibrium for a discrete-time model of resource exploitation by infinitely-lived Kantian and Nashian players, where we define Kantian agents as those who act in accordance with the categorical imperative. We revisit a well-known dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866318
The effectiveness of social interaction depends strongly on an ability to coordinate actions efficiently. In large networks, such coordination may be very difficult to achieve and may depend on the communication technology and the network structure. We examine how pre-play communication and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866385
The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common property renewable resource is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012860769
distribution of cost shares that motivates some coalition of agents to separate and to block an initially given Pareto optimal … allocation which can be interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation process when all agents form a grand coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270530