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Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor Contracts

Picard, Pierre M.; Wildasin, David E. - CESifo - 2009

Economic regions, such as urban agglomerations, face external demand and price shocks that produce income risk. Workers in large and diversified agglomerations may benefit from reduced wage volatility, while firms may outsource the production of intermediate goods and realize benefits from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013954

Limited Commitment Models of the Labour Market

Thomas, Jonathan; Worrall, Tim - CESifo - 2007

We present an overview of models of long-term self-enforcing labor contracts in which risk sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed which is sufficiently general to encompass the two-agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766123

The Distribution of Talent and the Pattern and Consequences of International Trade

Grossman, Gene - CESifo - 2002

In an economy with imperfect labor contracts, differences in the distribution of talent can be an independent source of comparative advantage. I study a world economy with two activities, one in which an individual's contribution to production can be measured accurately and another in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051520

Measuring Indirect Effects of Unfair Employer Behavior on Worker Productivity - A Field Experiment

Heinz, Matthias - 2018

We present a field experiment in which we set up a call-center to study how the productivity of workers is affected if managers treat their co-workers in an unfair way. This question cannot be studied in long-lived organizations since workers may change their career expectations (and hence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929481

Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives

Dur, Robert A. J.; Sol, Joeri - 2021

Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve highquality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316438

Reforming Legislatures: Is one House better than two?

Facchini, Giovanni; Testa, Cecilia - CESifo - 2009

constitutional reforms. In a setting where lawmakers interact with a lobby through a bargaining process and with voters by means of … elections, we show that when time constraints are binding, bicameralism might lead to a decline in the legislator's bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979403

Bargaining with a Residual Claimant: An Experimental Study

Embrey, Matthew; Hyndman, Kyle; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2014

We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player …. Moreover, bargaining frictions increase as risk increases, and we document more frequent disagreements as risk increases. When … bargaining models require some separation between the determinants of bargaining power and fair compensation for risk exposure. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086455

The Taxation of Bilateral Trade with Endogenous Information

Dang, Tri Vi; Morath, Florian - CESifo - 2015

show that a profit tax and a transaction tax have opposite implications for equilibrium outcome in bargaining. A marginal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011120474

Hanging Together or Being Hung Separately: The Strategic Power of Coalitions where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information

Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - CESifo - 2013

additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877880

To Commit or not to Commit? An Experimental Investigation of Pre-Commitments in Bargaining Situations with Asymmetric Information

Hoffmann, Sönke; Mihm, Benedikt; Weimann, Joachim - CESifo - 2014

In a recent paper Konrad and Thum (2014) present a model that shows that unilateral pre-commitment reduces the likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over their contribution costs. We test the model in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877951