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Kwon, Suehyun - 2019

This paper characterizes when the one-stage deviation IC constraints in the usual sense of dynamic mechanism design are sufficient. One can easily construct examples of when they are not sufficient. If the current state or the belief is not a sufficient summary statics of the agent's private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901080

Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Gary-Bobo, Robert J. - 2013

We completely characterize the set of second-best optimal “menus”of student-loan contracts in a simple economy with risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans and an elementary optimal income-tax problem à la...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080006

Dynamic Commercial Lobbying

Groll, Thomas; Ellis, Christopher J. - CESifo - 2013

This study explains the observed repeated personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. The analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying in which citizens may hire lobbyists to present policy proposals on their behalf to policymakers. It is shown that repeated interactions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610089

A Nested Contest: Tullock Meets the All-pay Auction

Amegashie, J. Atsu - CESifo - 2012

(lottery) contest and the all-pay auction. A Nash equilibrium exists for all parameters of the nested contest. If and only if … aggregate efforts in the all-pay auction are higher than the aggregate efforts in the Tullock contest, then aggregate efforts in … the nested contest may not lie between aggregate efforts in the all-pay auction and aggregate efforts in the Tullock …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010586076

Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence : Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform

Goerke, Laszlo - 2012

In 1996, statutory sick pay was reduced for private sector workers in Germany. Using the empirical observation that trade union members are dismissed less often than non-members, we construct a model to predict how absence behavior will respond to the sick pay reform. We show that union members...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013101198

On the Desirability of Taxing Capital Income to Reduce Moral Hazard in Social Insurance

Jacobs, Bas - 2009

This paper analyzes optimal linear taxes on labor income and savings in a standard two-period life-cycle model with endogenous leisure demands in both periods and non-insurable income risks. Households are subject to skill shocks in both periods of the life-cycle. We allow for completely general...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155825

Long-Term Employment Relations When Agents are Present Biased

Englmaier, Florian - 2016

We analyze how agents' present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite-horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a virtual contract - which agents plan to choose in the future - and a real contract which they end up...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978071

Do Natural Hazards Cause International Migration?

Gröschl, Jasmin - 2016

The estimated amount of people affected by natural hazards stands at a staggering number of about 243 million people per year. While not all of the affected move across borders, international migration potentially provides an adaptation mechanism to natural hazards. The aim of this paper is to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978452

Moral Hazard and Bargaining Over Incentive Contracts

Dittrich, Marcus - 2014

This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker's effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048890

Government Guarantees and Bank Risk Taking Incentives

Fischer, Markus - 2014

This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of guarantees for German Landesbanken which results in lower credit ratings, higher funding costs, and a loss in franchise value. This removal was announced in 2001, but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055384

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