In this paper we provide some technical results related to the Lorenz dominance, which allow to prove that the allocation obtained by the algorithm in Dutta and Ray (1989), when exists, and the elements of the equal split-off set always Lorenz dominate every allocation in the core of the game

This paper defines models of cooperation among players partitioning a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players' ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility of...

Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs...

This paper examines several monotonicity properties of value-type interval solutions on the class of convex interval games and focuses on the Dutta-Ray (DR) solution for such games. Well known properties for the classical DR solution are extended to the interval setting. In particular, it is...

This paper deals with cost allocation problems arising from connection situations where edge costs are closed intervals of real numbers. To solve such problems, we extend classical solutions from the theory of minimum cost spanning tree games. We study the properties of such solutions and...

In this paper we consider spanning tree problems, where n players want to be connected to a source as cheap as possible. We introduce and analyze (n!) vertex oriented construct and charge procedures for such spanning tree situations leading in n steps to a minimum cost spanning tree and a cost...

In this paper we consider one-machine sequencing situations with interval data. We present different possible scenarioes and extend classical results on well known rules and on sequencing games to the interval setting

Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In the results, dual games and the self-duality of the value implicitly play an important role. A set of non-cooperative games which implement the Shapley value on the class of all games is given