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Market competition or family ties : which prevails on Italian CEOs pay?
Graziano, Clara; Rondi, Laura - 2015 - This draft: June 8, 2015
The paper analyzes the interplay of product market competition and governance on CEO compensation in Italian listed firms from 2000 to 2011 and tests the impact of the 2007-08 financial crisis on pay-performance sensitivity. We argue that important differences both in the level of compensation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011280832
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Discrimination, managers, and firm performance : evidence from "aryanizations" in Nazi Germany
Huber, Kilian; Lindenthal, Volker; Waldinger, Fabian - 2020
Large-scale increases in discrimination can lead to dismissals of highly qualified managers. We investigate how … expulsions of senior Jewish managers, due to rising discrimination in Nazi Germany, affected large corporations. Firms that lost … Jewish managers experienced persistent reductions in stock prices, dividends, and returns on assets. Aggregate market value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012382240
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Executive compensation : a survey of theory and evidence
Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier; Jenter, Dirk - 2017
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700396
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Relative performance feedback to teams
Gjedrem, William Gilje; Kvaløy, Ola - 2018
Between and within firms, work teams compete against each other and receive feedback on how well their team is performing relative to their benchmarks. In this paper we investigate experimentally how teams respond to relative performance feedback (RPF) at team level. We find that when subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793858
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Corporate deductibility provisions and managerial incentives
Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - 2013
findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227267
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A theory of tax avoidance : managerial incentives for tax planning in a multi-task principal-agent model
Ewert, Ralf; Niemann, Rainer - 2014
We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010367166
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Management incentives under formula apportionment : tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting
Martini, Jan T.; Niemann, Rainer; Simons, Dirk - 2014
compensation to managers in low-tax jurisdictions, if payroll enters the FA formula. Managers in high-tax jurisdictions face the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383849
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Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Hili, Amal; Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo Van - 2016
We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538964
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Yes, managers should be paid like bureaucrats
Frey, Bruno S. (contributor); Osterloh, Margit (contributor) - 2005
. Agency theory’s insistence on linking the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002572375
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CEO compensation : evidence from the field
Edmans, Alex; Gosling, Tom; Jenter, Dirk - 2021
We survey directors and investors on the objectives, constraints, and determinants of CEO pay. 67% of directors would sacrifice shareholder value to avoid controversy on CEO pay, implying they face significant constraints other than participation and incentive compatibility. These constraints...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584217