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Optimal delegation when the large shareholder has multiple tasks
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2010
We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965886
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Managerial hedging and portfolio monitoring
Bisin, Alberto (contributor); Gottardi, Piero (contributor);  … - 2004
Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their firms. We study the agency problem between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521243
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Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting
Khalil, Fahad (contributor); Martimort, David (contributor);  … - 2005
We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003113311
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Self-confidence and reactions to subjective performance evaluations
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - 2018
Subjective performance evaluations are commonly used to provide feedback and incentives to workers. However, such evaluations can generate significant disagreements and conflicts, the severity of which may be driven by many factors. In this paper we show that a workers' level of self-confidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927889
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Towards a theory of trade finance
Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim - 2011
enforcement probabilities and decreases in financing costs proportional to the time needed for trade. Empirical results from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011800
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Corporate deductibility provisions and managerial incentives
Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - 2013
Using an agency model of firm behavior, the paper analyzes whether the cost of investment should be tax exempt. The findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is tax deductible, as commonly advocated. The extent to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227267
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A theory of tax avoidance : managerial incentives for tax planning in a multi-task principal-agent model
Ewert, Ralf; Niemann, Rainer - 2014
We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010367166
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Flexible contracts
Gottardi, Piero; Tallon, Jean-Marc; Ghirardato, Paolo - 2010
This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of … play then an important role in determining the costs of delegation. The main focus of the paper lies indeed in the analysis … of these costs and the consequences for whether or not delegation is optimal. We determine and characterize the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003936681
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Optimal rent extraction in pre-industrial England and France : default risk and monitoring costs
Priks, Mikael (contributor) - 2005
to both the old system and to its major competitor, France. We offer a theory explaining this development. In our view, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002855576
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Corporate taxation and corporate governance
Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - 2009
The effects of corporate taxation on firm behavior have been extensively discussed in the neoclassical model of firm behavior which abstracts from agency problems. As emphasized by the corporate governance literature, corporate investment behavior is however crucially influenced by diverging...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923146