Similar Search Results

Market competition or family ties : which prevails on Italian CEOs pay?

Graziano, Clara; Rondi, Laura - 2015 - This draft: June 8, 2015

The paper analyzes the interplay of product market competition and governance on CEO compensation in Italian listed firms from 2000 to 2011 and tests the impact of the 2007-08 financial crisis on pay-performance sensitivity. We argue that important differences both in the level of compensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011280832

Discrimination, managers, and firm performance : evidence from "aryanizations" in Nazi Germany

Huber, Kilian; Lindenthal, Volker; Waldinger, Fabian - 2020

Large-scale increases in discrimination can lead to dismissals of highly qualified managers. We investigate how … expulsions of senior Jewish managers, due to rising discrimination in Nazi Germany, affected large corporations. Firms that lost … Jewish managers experienced persistent reductions in stock prices, dividends, and returns on assets. Aggregate market value …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012382240

Executive compensation : a survey of theory and evidence

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier; Jenter, Dirk - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700396

Relative performance feedback to teams

Gjedrem, William Gilje; Kvaløy, Ola - 2018

Between and within firms, work teams compete against each other and receive feedback on how well their team is performing relative to their benchmarks. In this paper we investigate experimentally how teams respond to relative performance feedback (RPF) at team level. We find that when subjects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793858

Corporate deductibility provisions and managerial incentives

Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - 2013

findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227267

A theory of tax avoidance : managerial incentives for tax planning in a multi-task principal-agent model

Ewert, Ralf; Niemann, Rainer - 2014

We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010367166

Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants

Hili, Amal; Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo Van - 2016

We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538964

EVA and the controllability-congruence trade-off : an empirical investigation

Ponssard, Jean-Pierre; Larmande, François - 2004

qualitative feedback from the managers involved, are analyzed. It is argued that EVA bonus schemes may have a major …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450490

Attention-driven demand for bonus contracts

Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Köster, Mats; Peiseler, Florian - 2019

In many markets supply contracts include a series of small, regular payments made by consumers and a single, large bonus that consumers receive at some point during the contractual period. But, if for instance its production costs exceed its value to consumers, such a bonus creates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011983621

Yes, managers should be paid like bureaucrats

Frey, Bruno S. (contributor); Osterloh, Margit (contributor) - 2005

. Agency theory’s insistence on linking the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002572375

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last