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Too big to prevail : the paradox of power in coalition formation
Ke, Changxia; Morath, Florian; Newell, Anthony; Page, Lionel - 2021
In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012494898
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Investment uncertainty, and production games
Flåm, Sjur D.; Ermolʹev, Jurij M. - 2004
-correlated returns. Any such project stabilizes the aggregate proceeds. Therefore, given widespread risk exposure and aversion, that … scale such games are quite tractable in analysis, computation, and realization. A core imputation comes in terms of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401340
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Taxing direct sales of digital services : a plea for regulated and internationally coordinated profit splitting
Richter, Wolfram F. - 2018 - This version: April 2018
The employment of capital is rival in nature. Small countries do not benefit from taxing its employment. By contrast, the use of digital services is non-rival and small countries do benefit from taxing expenditures on such services. In fact, some countries have already decided to tax digital...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011845180
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The ex ante incentive compatible core in exchange economies with and without indivisibilities
Forges, Françoise (contributor) - 2006
The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d'Aspremont and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301240
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Conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion
Cubitt, Robin P.; Gächter, Simon; Quercia, Simone - 2015
betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in … optimistic ones typically contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being exploited. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298544
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Cooperating, fast and slow : testing the social heuristics hypothesis
Strømland, Eirik; Tjøtta, Sigve; Torsvik, Gaute - 2016
Are humans intuitively cooperative, or do we need to deliberate in order to be generous to others? The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) proposes that fast instinctive decision making promotes cooperation in social dilemmas. In this paper, we conduct a novel time-pressure experiment to shed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011458007
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Anticipated international environmental agreements
Açıkgöz, Ömer T.; Benchekroun, Hassan - 2016
Consider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement (IEA) to be in effect sometime in the future. What is the impact of the future IEA on current emissions after its announcement? We show that the answer to this question is ambiguous. We examine four types...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011565652
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The roots of cooperation
Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; … - 2021 - This version: 10 June 2021
Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintening public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547006
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The roots of cooperation
Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; … - 2021
We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment – emerges earliest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012668493
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A Dynamic Game with Interaction between Kantian Players and Nashian Players
Long, Ngo Van - 2019
This paper defines the concept of feedback Kant-Nash equilibrium for a discrete-time model of resource exploitation by infinitely-lived Kantian and Nashian players, where we define Kantian agents as those who act in accordance with the categorical imperative. We revisit a well-known dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012031053