Showing 1 - 10 of 54
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001737581
that labour markets clear competitively. At least for Europe which has been suffering fom high unemployment for a long time …, this assumption does not seem appropriate. This paper studies the optimal factor taxation in the presence of unemployment … the private sector playing a Nash game. The main conclusion is that in the presence of unemployment, the conventional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001477212
Endogenous timing can help to derive the time structure of decision making instead of assuming it as exogenously given. In our study we consider a homogeneous market where, like in the model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), sellers determine "sales capacities" before prices. Sellers must serve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001512855
Calling upon both positive and normative economics, we attempt to characterize the issues at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change. We begin (Section 2) by reviewing the main features of the Protocol. Then (Section 3), we identify by means of an elementary economic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001452220
Compared with the traditional public-finance approach of a monolithic fully informed planner, earmarking of taxation is less likely to be optimal if a principal-agent setting is considered, where taxing and spending are performed by two separate agents which are monitored by the parliament. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001440827
This paper analyses the problem of designing macroeconomic stabilization policies within the European Monetary Union (EMU) as a dynamic game between a centralized monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), and national fiscal policy makers. Non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001473958
Economic policy is modeled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature the policies fought for are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001474364
The formation of social ties is examined in an experimental study of voluntary public good provision. The experimental design consists of three parts. In the first part the value orientation (attitude to a generalized other) is measured. In the second part couples play a multi-period public good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001474389
The authors construct an asymmetric duopolistic R&D and production behavior model subject to knowledge spillovers. This model is an extension to the symmetric model of d'Aspremont and Jaquemin (A&J (1988)) and aims to determine the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategiesfor two agents of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001480419
The paper considers a two-country model of overlapping generations economies with intergenerational transfers carried out in the form of bequest and investment in human capital. The authors examine in competitive equlibrium the optimal provision of education with and without capital markets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001489391