We analyze the competition between two newspapers in a vertical differentiation model where the qualities of the journals are determined endogenously in the first stage of the game. We show that when the advertising revenues per reader increase there is a critical value above which the quality...

We consider a situation of duopolistic competition in the press industry, involving two editors competing in both the newspapers' and advertising markets. The population of readers in this market is differentiated in terms of their attitudes toward advertising; some of them are assumed to be...

We study access pricing by platforms providing internet services ot pay-TV to users while they allow advertisers to have access to these users against payment via ads or banners. Users are assumed to be ad-haters. It is shown that equilibrium access prices in the users'market are increasing in...

We characterize the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium of an extension of the "television news sheduling game" of Cancian, Bergstrom and Bills (1995) where viewers want to watch the first newscast broadcast after they return home. A fraction of the viewers record randomly one of the newscast to...

We study a simple bilateral oligopoly model in which individual agents, who are initially endowed with capital, decide sequentially (i) whether they want to act as producers (entrepreneurs) or as capital lenders (rentiers) and, then (ii) which quantity of capital they would like to borrow or...

The press industry depends in a crucial way on the possibility of financing an important fraction of its activities by advertising receipts. We show that this induces the editors of the newspapers to moderate the political message they display to their readers in order to make their newspaper...

In this paper we model a situation of competition between two editors who are rivals in both the newpapers' and advertising industries.. To identify the consequences of this competition, we analyse a two-period sequential game whose players are the editors each selling a differentiated...

Generally, economists interested in network effects analyse these effects when the consumption externality created by the demand for the good is produced inside the industry itself. But it can be conceived that network effects take place from one industry to another. This happens when the...

We analyse the rivalry between two TV-channels competing both on the market for audience and the market for advertising. We identify the nature of TV-programs emerging from this competition, and the quantity of advertising that TV-viewers will have to attend at equilibrium. Finally, we examine...

This paper first introduces an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies do operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting...