There is a wide range of economic problems involving the exchange of indivisible goods without monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper of Shapley and Scarf [10] and including other problems like the kidney exchange or the school choice problems. For many...

We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies in which agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. In this context, we investigate procedural and...

We study equity in economies where agents are endowed with different, non transferable, personal talents. To compensate them for such differences a given amount of money needs to be shared among them. We axiomatize a family of social orderings over allocations based on efficiency, fairness and...

We present a new version of the overtaking criterion, which we call generalized time invariant overtaking. The generalized time-invariant overtaking criterion (on the space of infinite utility streams) is defined by extending proliferating sequences of complete and transitive binary relations...

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for k periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is...

The veil of ignorance has been used often as a tool of recommending what justice requires with respect to the distribution of wealth. We complete Harsanyi's model of the veil of ignorance by appending information permitting objective comparisons among persons. We show that the veil-of-ignorance...

This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of...

This paper examines t,he core of a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information in which staLe-dependent, allocations are required to satisfy incentive compatibility. This restriction on players' strategies in the cooperative game can be interpreted as incomplete contracts or partial...

In a framework of preferences over lotteries, we show that an axiom system consisting of weakened versions of Arrow's axioms has a unique solution. "Relative Utilitarianism" consists of first normalising individual von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities between 0 and 1 and then summing them. This...

This paper is concerned with the asymptotic behavior of some global quantities relating to weighted decision rules when the number of small voters tends to infinity. First, voting is assumed to be motivated by interests, so that the collective decision is "preference aggregation". Here the...