Preference aggregation versus truth-tracking: asymptotic properties of a related story
Year of publication: |
2005-01
|
---|---|
Authors: | LINDNER, Ines |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | majority games | weighted voting games | complaisance | Condorcet’s Jury Theorem |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2005002 |
Classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
Source: |
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