Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the … unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: in the first one, firms disclose … quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own …

the effect of connecting a household to the grid and the quality of electricity, defined as hours of daily supply. The … quality of electricity (in terms of fewer outages and more hours per day) increases non-agricultural incomes by about 28 …

We investigate the design of incentives for quality provision in a dynamic regulation setting in which maintenance … efforts and quality shocks have durable effects. When the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents, asymmetries of … information can lead to overprovision of quality, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction motive. When the regulator hires a single …

We investigate the design of incentives for public good quality provision in a dynamic regulation setting in which … maintenance efforts and quality shocks have durable effects. When the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents, asymmetries … of information can lead to over-provision of quality under optimal regulation, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction …

conveys full information about the quality of the good to uninformed buyers. Deceiving the uninformed buyers by charging a … high price and mimicking a high quality is not profitable when the competitive fringe is large enough. Since a higher price …

sells the good one. We show that if the production of the high quality requires higher cost, its producer may be severly … favour of the efficient high quality producer, yet it is its inefficient rival that monopolizes the market! This result …

monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on …

We present a diagrammatic and step-by-step analysis of price signaling quality. Because quality is a continuum on the … equilibrium. We first study the behavior of the monopoly when price conveys information about quality. We then show the effect of …

We embed signaling in the classical Cournot model in which several firms sell a homogeneous good. The quality is known … to all the firms, but only to some buyers. The quantity-setting firms can manipulate the price to signal quality. Because … quantity decision. We characterize the unique signaling Cournot equilibrium in which the price signals quality to the …

This study explores the formation of buyer-seller relationships in markets with observable quality. We develop a model …