This paper studies the design of a mining concession contract as a multi-period autoselection problem where production is the depletion of a non renewable resource. As compared to symmetric information, we show that overproduction (resp. underproduction) is optimal in the initial phase (resp....

Nous transposons la problématique de l’effet de remplacement du monopole de Arrow) dans le cadre d’une économie d’une ressource non renouvelable. En considérant les incitations à innover immédiatement, on peut alors montrer que le résultat de sub-optimalité du monopole n’est pas...

This article analyzes the optimal contract design between an inventor and a developer. The inventor is privately informed on the value of his idea. The developer must exert some non-verifiable effort to improve the probability of success of this innovation but may also choose to opt out of the...

The process of deregulation in network industries, in particular in the electric sector, raises the problem of financing the Universal Service Obligations (USO) corresponding to the production, transport and distribution operations. In this paper, we study three ways of funding for an USO of...

This paper takes into account adverse selection in the implementation of universal service obligations (USOs) for a network industry with no bypass. USOs are characterized by a coverage constraint imposed on the network’s owner. We develop fully the model for a welfare maximizing coverage...