This paper considers situations characterized by a common-pool resource, which needs to be divided among agents. Each of the agents has some claim on this pool and an individual reward function for assigned resources. This paper analyzes not only the problem of maximizing the total joint reward,...

To verify whether a transferable utility game is exact, one has to check a linear inequality for each exact balanced collection of coalitions. This paper studies the structure and properties of the class of exact balanced collections. Comparing the definition of exact balanced collections with...

This paper builds on the recent work of Groote Schaarsberg, Reijnierse and Borm (2018) on mutual liability problems. In essence, a mutual liability problem comprises a financial network in which agents may have both monetary individual assets and mutual liabilities. Here mutual liabilities...

This paper introduces a framework for joint hub network development. Building a joint physical hub for transhipment of goods is expensive and therefore involves considerable risks for the cooperating companies. In a practical setting, it is unlikely that an entire network will be built at once....

To model inter-individual externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue, Ju and Borm (2005) introduces a new game-theoretic framework, primeval games, and proposes, from a cooperative perspective, three compensation rules as solution concepts for primeval games: the marginalistic...

To model inter-individual externalities and analyze the associated compensation issue, Ju and Borm (2005) introduces a new game-theoretic framework, primeval games, and proposes, from a cooperative perspective, three compensation rules as solution concepts for primeval games: the marginalistic...

The classical literature (Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), Arrow (1970)) and the relatively recent studies (cf. Varian (1994)) associate the externality problem with efficiency. This paper focuses explicitly on the compensation problem in the context of externalities. To capture the features of...

This paper discusses minimum cost spanning tree games and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each agent's decision whether or not to...

In order to be able to devise successful strategies for destabilizing terrorist organizations it is vital to recognize and understand their structural properties. This paper deals with the optimal communication structure of terrorist organizations when considering the tradeoff between secrecy...