In standard auction theory, the 'revenue equivalence theorem' asserts that the outcomes of the elementary allocation methods coincide. However, bidding processes differ fundamentally with regard to the decision situation of the participants: Is it at all imperative to take into consideration the...

Die etablierte Auktionstheorie modelliert vier elementare Bietverfahren als Spiele, in denen die Natur anfänglich den Typ der Akteure determiniert. Das von dieser (Vor-)Auswahl abhängige Gleichgewicht kennzeichnet sich durch wechselseitig beste Antworten aller Beteiligten. Laut „Revenue...

This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.

We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants face these four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to examine whether...