As outside advisors, independent directors serve as both consultants and monitors. Based on empirical studies of corporate innovation and independent directors, we used data from listed firms in China from 2007 to 2017 to examine the effect of hiring independent technical directors on the board...

This paper focuses on the effect of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on top managers’ compensation in Chinese public firms. Overall, we find no evidence of an RPE effect or any asymmetry in firms’ use of RPE. The results obtained using Albuquerque’s (2009) method are similar to those...

According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, contracts are not always perfect. Managers may exert influence on the...

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based...

This study investigates how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) affects the contractual benefits of using accounting information to determine executive compensation in China. After controlling for firm and corporate governance characteristics, we find...

This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer (CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the 1999-2007 period and...

This paper examines executive compensation in the subsidiaries of business groups in China. Analyzing a sample of China business groups (the so-called “XiZu JiTuan” in Chinese) from 2003 to 2012, we find convincing evidence of the use of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) in the executive...

Foreign firms face enormous obstacles in attracting investors and analysts when issuing securities in the United States. We use US-listed Chinese firms as our research sample and find that firms that hire top executives (i.e., Chief Executive Officer [CEO] or Chief Financial Officer [CFO]) with...

Unlike previous studies that focus on accrual-based earnings management, this study analyzes real activities manipulation and investigates whether female directors on boards of directors (BoDs) affect managers’ real activities manipulation. Using a large sample of 11,831 firm-year observations...

Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China's SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed...