We study settings in which, prior to playing an incomplete information game, players observe many draws of private … signals about the state from some information structure. Signals are i.i.d. across draws, but may display arbitrary … correlation across players. For each information structure, we define a simple learning efficiency index, which only considers the …

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …

from the previous players to fathom the past. Each player is therefore both a receiver of information with respect to his …

a large negative impact on long-run learning outcomes. We consider a population of agents who obtain information about … distribution can generate extreme breakdowns of information aggregation, wherein the long run all agents incorrectly assign … how the nature of misperception shapes these coarse long-run outcomes. Third, we show that how fragile information …