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Bergemann, Dirk - 2010

independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time.We analyze the first-price auction … disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In … equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139373

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047743

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2015

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over valuations, we characterize the set of possible outcomes that can arise in a Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning-bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Bergemann, Dirk - 2017

minimal disclosure regime each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction. In equilibrium the allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012948369

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann, Dirk - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245

Targeting in Advertising Markets : Implications for Offline vs. Online Media

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

We develop a model with many advertisers (products) and many advertising markets (media). Each advertiser sells to a different segment of consumers, and each medium has a different ability to target advertising messages. We characterize the competitive equilibrium in the media markets and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013069405

Selling Cookies

Bergemann, Dirk - 2013

We analyze data pricing and targeted advertising. Advertisers seek to tailor their spending to the value of each consumer. A monopolistic data provider sells cookies -- informative signals about individual consumers' preferences. We characterize the set of consumers targeted by the advertisers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013073446

On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities

Meneghel, Idione - 2020

of our results, we provide an analysis of three auctions: (i) a ﬁrst-price auction of objects that are heterogeneous and … imperfect substitutes; (ii) a ﬁrst-price auction in which bidders' payoﬀs have a very general interdependence structure; and … (iii) an all-pay auction with non-monotone equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839304