This essay offers an exposition of the potential uses of game theoretic reasoning and mathematical models in the study of the prevention of nuclear war.

This paper is devoted to a discussion of several simple experimental games used in a series of lectures on game theory. The prime purpose of these games was to raise questions and illustrate problems in the construction of game theoretical models in the social sciences. The students were asked...

The central contribution of game theory to defense analysis has been a language for the understanding of how to formulate and study strategic or cross-purposes optimization in situations involving two or more actors. It is suggested here in this discussion that two fundamentally different...

A broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since the 1950s is given together with some comments on important open problems and where some of the developments may take place. The nearly 90 references given serve only as a minimal guide to the many thousands of books...

The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal comparisons of utility, and the reconsideration of Stone results on prominence in contrast with symmetry.

This article deals with experimental games as they pertain to game theory. As such there is a natural distinction between experimentation with abstract games devoted to testing a specific hypothesis in game theory and games with a scenario from a discipline such as economics or political science...

Existence of equilibrium is proved for an exchange strategic market game with complete markets. An example of equilibrium with inconsistent prices is given.

The set of possible outcomes of a strongly ordinal bimatrix game is studied by imbedding each pair of possible payoffs as a point on the standard two-dimensional integral lattice. In particular, we count the number of different Pareto optimal sets of each cardinality; we establish asymptotic...

This is the first projected series of papers on solutions to games in matrix and extensive form.

We introduce a model of the 2 x 2 games played by agents or subordinates of the players. We assume that each agent or subordinates of the players. We assume that each agent is not as perceptive as his commander in that he can make only two distinctions among the four outcomes whose value can be...