Showing 1 - 10 of 15
In our previous paper we built a general equilibrium model of default and punishment in which equilibrium always exists and endogenously determines asset promises, penalties, and sales constraints. In this paper we interpret the endogenous sales constraints as equilibrium signals. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463898
equilibrium always exists in our model, and that default, in conjunction with refinement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463908
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. Weidentify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and -- in economic environments -- sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicityno veto...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463973
We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201348
We build a model of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signalling into general equilibrium. Pools are characterized by their quantity limits on contributions. Households signal their reliability by choosing which pool to join. In equilibrium, pools with lower quantity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990814
This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution concept. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998323
theory. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, we show that equilibrium always … for better risk spreading. We also show that default opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087374
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087384
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment with single crossing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087399
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with a social choice function. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593322