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The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games

Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal comparisons of utility, and the reconsideration of Stone results on prominence in contrast with symmetry.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762670

The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: A Summary of a Game Theoretic Approach

Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institution is given utilizing both the strategic and coalitional forms for describing the economy. The economy is first modeled as a strategic market game, then the strategic form is used to calculate several cooperative forms that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762688

Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments

Qin, Chen-Zhong; Shapley, Lloyd S.; Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

A link between a no-side-payment (NSP) market game and a side-payment (SP) market game can be established by introducing a sufficient amount of an ideal utility-money of constant marginal utility to all agents. At some point when there is "enough money" in the system, if it is "well distributed"...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008479208

Bargaining and Markets: Complexity and the Walrasian Outcome

Sabourian, Hamid - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2000

are no transaction costs, the outcome of this matching and bargaining game should be the unique competitive equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593559

Kantian Allocations

Roemer, John E. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

Several authors in the economics literature have referred to Kantian behavior, informally, as a kind of cooperation. We … turns out that Kant's categorical imperative only implies cooperation (solidaristic behavior) conditional upon the rewards … to cooperation being sufficiently great, perhaps a sobering thought for philosophical Kantians who believe that Kant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463965

The Edgeworth, Cournot and Walrasian Cores of an Economy

Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005464037

Fairness through the Lens of Cooperative Game Theory: An Experimental Approach

Clippel, Geoffroy de; Rozen, Kareen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013

This paper experimentally investigates cooperative game theory from a normative perspective. Subjects designated as Decision Makers express their view on what is fair for others, by recommending a payoff allocation for three subjects (Recipients) whose substitutabilities and complementarities...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895694

Lexicographic Composition of Simple Games

O'Neill, Barry; Peleg, Bezalel - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

A two-house legislature can often be modelled as a proper simple game whose outcome depends on whether a coalition wins, blocks or loses in two smaller proper simple games. It is shown that there are exactly five ways to combine the smaller games into a larger one. This paper focuses on one of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087366

Absenteeism, Substitutes, and Complements in Simple Games

Quint, Thomas; Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

A voting with absenteeism game is defined as a pair (G;r) where G is an n-player (monotonic) simple game and r is an n-vector for which r_i is the probability that player i attends a vote. We define a power index for such games, called the absentee index. We axiomatize the absentee index and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087387

A Computational Analysis of the Core of a Trading Economy with Three Competitive Equilibria and a Finite Number of Traders

Shubik, Martin; Kumar, Alok - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

In this paper we examine the structure of the core of a trading economy with three competitive equilibria as the number of traders (N) is varied. We also examine the sensitivity of the multiplicity of equilibria and of the core to variations in individual initial endowments. Computational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593218