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This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008800354
Psychological experiments demonstrate that people exhibit a taste for consistency. Individuals are inclined to interpret new evidence in ways that confirm their pre-existing beliefs. They also tend to change their beliefs to enhance the desirability of their past actions. I present a model that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463891
In many democratic countries, the timing of elections is flexible. We explore this potentially valuable option using insights from option pricing in finance. The paper offers three main contributions on this problem. First, we derive a rationally-based mean-reverting political support process...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463899
rate of taxation is determined by voting. Starting conditions play only a minor role for outcomes of the economies, as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009352219
effects, invisible college coalition voting and inner sanctum bias. The rule considered here is designed to assist the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358885
contributions or taxation, 23 out of 24 voting decisions favor taxation. Taxation appears to be superior on grounds of both long run …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010686937
. The voters must choose a subset of K. We define a class of voting schemes called voting by committees. The main result of … the paper is a characterization of voting by committees, which is the class of all voting schemes that satisfy voter … Groves and Clarke scheme in that it characterizes all of the non-manipulable voting schemes on an important domain. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762679
A celebrated result of Black (1984a) demonstrates the existence of a simple majority winner when preferences are single-peaked. The social choice follows the preferences of the median voter's most preferred outcome beats any alternative. However, this conclusion does not extend to elections in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593158
A two-house legislature can often be modelled as a proper simple game whose outcome depends on whether a coalition wins, blocks or loses in two smaller proper simple games. It is shown that there are exactly five ways to combine the smaller games into a larger one. This paper focuses on one of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087366
This paper brings mechanism design to the study of conflict resolution in international relations. We determine when and how unmediated communication and mediation reduce the ex ante probability of conflict, in a simple game where conflict is due to asymmetric information. Unmediated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511591