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Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication
Gerardi, Dino; Myerson, Roger B. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005
We study the effects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some … combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We … communication equilibrium (SCE) defined by Myerson (1986) in that SCE allows the possibility of trembles by the mediator. We show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762852
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Starting Small and Commitment
Watson, Joel - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1999
I study a model of a long-term partnership with two-sided incomplete information. The partners jointly determine the stakes of their relationship and individually decide whether to cooperate with or betray each other over time. I characterize the extremal -- interim incentive efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762785
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An Optimal Fair Job Assignment Problem
Yang, Zaifu - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2002
We study the problem of how to allocate a set of indivisible objects like jobs or houses and an amount of money among a group of people as fairly and as efficiently as possible. A particular constraint for such an allocation is that every person should be assigned with the same number of objects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593278
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Perfectly Fair Allocations with Indivisibilities
Sun, Ning; Yang, Zaifu - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001
One set of n objects of type I, another set of n objects of type II, and an amount M of money is to be completely allocated among n agents in such a way that each agent gets one object of each type with some amount of money. We propose a new solution concept to this problem called a perfectly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087375
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On Fair Allocations and Indivisibilities
Sun, Ning; Yang, Zaifu - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001
This paper studies the problem of how to distribute a set of indivisible objects with an amount M of money among a number of agents in a fair way. We allow any number of agents and objects. Objects can be desirable or undesirable and the amount of money can be negative as well. In case M is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093928
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Selling Information
Horner, Johannes; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009
We study a dynamic buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The potential buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value to him is uncertain, but the seller cannot credibly convey its value to the buyer without disclosing the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511589
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Should Auctions be Transparent?
Bergemann, Dirk; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010
We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with private and independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time. We analyze the first-price auction under three distinct disclosure regimes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511590
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Pundits and Quacks
Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015
Do asset prices aggregate investors’ private information about the ability of financial analysts? We show that as financial analysts become reputable, the market can get trapped: Investors optimally choose to ignore their private information, and blindly follow analyst recommendations. As time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240393
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Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255267
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The Implementation Duality
Noldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015
We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201348