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Minimally Complex Exchange Mechanisms: Emergence of Prices, Markets, and Money
Dubey, Pradeep; Sahi, Siddhartha; Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2014
directed graphs G in a precise sense. The edges of G can be regarded as markets for commodity pairs, and prices play a stronger …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817223
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Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria
Morris, Stephen; Ui, Takashi - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003
This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets … behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of … existing sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762463
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Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions
Bergemann, Dirk; Wambach, Achim - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement an ascending price auction in which each losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939339
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The Allocation of a Prize (R)
Dubey, Pradeep; Sahi, Siddhartha - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012
Consider agents who undertake costly effort to produce stochastic outputs observable by a principal. The principal can award a prize deterministically to the agent with the highest output, or to all of them with probabilities that are proportional to their outputs. We show that, if there is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539821
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Information Structures in Optimal Auctions
Bergemann, Dirk; Pesendorfer, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762850
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Money as Minimal Complexity
Dubey, Pradeep; Sahi, Siddhartha; Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2015
decentralized markets for the other commodities. Our main result is that, for any weights \lambda, \mu > 0; the star mechanism is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011170531
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Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction
Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Benjamin; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
We study how the outcomes of a private-value first price auction can vary with bidders' information, for a fixed distribution of private values. In a two bidder, two value, setting, we characterize all combinations of bidder surplus and revenue that can arise, and identify the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895653
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Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions
Bergemann, Dirk; Wambach, Achim - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2013
We consider the design of an optimal auction in which the seller can determine the allocation and the disclosure rule of the mechanism. Thus, in contrast to the standard analysis of a optimal auctions, the seller can explicitly design the disclosure of the information received by each bidder as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895662
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The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs
Chen, Yi-Chun; Tillio, Alfredo Di; Faingold, Eduardo; … - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2012
severity of this robustness problem by characterizing conditions on the primitives of the model -- the players’ hierarchies of …) in terms of beliefs. We apply our characterizations to a variety of questions concerning robustness to perturbations of … higher-order beliefs, including genericity of common priors, and the connections between robustness of strategic behavior and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817216
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Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087384