We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley-Scarf (1974), with indifferences in preferences allowed. It is well-known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single-valued, or multivalued. We define a condition on such games called "segmentability", which means that the set...

A large literature uses matching models to analyze markets with two-sided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the matching of students to schools, residents to hospitals, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. The analysis typically assumes that the agents have complete information, and...

The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal comparisons of utility, and the reconsideration of Stone results on prominence in contrast with symmetry.

A game theoretic approach to the theory of money and financial institution is given utilizing both the strategic and coalitional forms for describing the economy. The economy is first modeled as a strategic market game, then the strategic form is used to calculate several cooperative forms that...

A link between a no-side-payment (NSP) market game and a side-payment (SP) market game can be established by introducing a sufficient amount of an ideal utility-money of constant marginal utility to all agents. At some point when there is "enough money" in the system, if it is "well distributed"...

A feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any non-trivial partition of individuals with two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize...

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990b) consider a simple decentralized market in which agents either meet randomly or choose their partners volunatarily and bargain over the terms on which they are willing to trade. Intuition suggests that if there are no transaction costs, the outcome of this matching...

Several authors in the economics literature have referred to Kantian behavior, informally, as a kind of cooperation. We model this notion precisely, and define two kinds of Kantian allocation. An set of strategies by players is Kantian if, informally, no player would advocate that all players...

Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.