A simple dynamic general equilibrium model of savings and investment is populated by agents with Kreps-Porteus preferences. Households are heterogeneous in their risk aversion, which explains the negative relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty. Agents trade a...

We present a dynamic duopoly model of technical innovation where R&D costs decrease exogenously with time, and inter-firm knowledge spillover lowers the second comer's R&D cost. The spillover effect only becomes available after a disclosure lag. These features allow us to identify a new type of...

In our duopoly, an irreversible investment incorporates a significant amount of R&D, so that the improvement it introduces in production processes generates a spillover lowering the second comer's investment cost. The presence of the inter-firm spillover substantially affects the equilibrium of...

A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the final market. In a Cournot model, an extended RJV is welfare enhancing only when the Antitrust Authority is strong, so that the increase in distortion is limited, and when the size of the technical...

These notes provide an intuitive introduction to dynamic programming. The first two Sections present the standard deterministic Ramsey model using the Lagrangian approach. These can be skipped by whom is already acquainted with this framework. Section 3 shows how to solve the well understood...

We develop a dynamic duopoly, where firms have to take into account a technological externality, that reduces over time their innovation costs, and an inter-firm spillover, that lowers only the second comer's R&D cost. This spillover exerts its effect after a disclosure lag. We identify three...

We consider the strategic choice between product innovation and logistic optimization in a novel urban framework where consumers are distributed across the city and have different incomes depending on their location in the town. Depending on the relative efficiency of the product innovation...

We study optimal licensing contracts in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly, and show that per-unit contracts are preferred to ad valorem contracts by the patentee, while welfare is higher under the ad valorem contract. The difference between Cournot and Bertrand case is explained in terms of...

We survey the rich literature studying the behaviour of labor shares in recent decades. To explain their dynamics – the main feature being the decline of European and American shares starting in the 1980s – such literature considers models that use either neoclassical or Leontief-type...