Showing 1 - 7 of 7
Many conditions have been introduced to weaken the continuity re-quirements for equilibrium existence in games. We introduce a new con-dition, called regularity, that is simple and easy to verify. It is implied both by Reny's better-reply security and Simon and Zame's endogenous sharing rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282886
In models of non-deterministic contest, players exert irreversible effort in order to increase their probability of winning a prize. The most prominent functional form of the win probability in the literature is the so-called logit" contest success function. We provide a simple micro-foundation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266296
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266321
We de.ne and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action de.ne the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diþerence between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272319
In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be unambiguously interpreted as coming from a unique set of Sender-types. This occurs when these types are precisely the ones who gain from deviating for any beliefs the Re-ceiver could form over that set....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273822
We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suþer from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266285
This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266303