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Responsibility-Shifting through Delegation: Evidence from China's One-Child Policy

Liu, Yiming; Han, Yi - 2023

We provide evidence on how responsibility-shifting through delegation occurred in China's implementation of the one … responsibility-shifting effect of delegation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467724

A cooperative value for Bayesian games

Kalai, Adam; Kalai, Ehud - 2010

Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286981

Are Women Less Effective Leaders than Men? Evidence from Experiments Using Coordination Games

Heursen, Lea; Ranehill, Eva; Weber, Roberto - 2023

We study whether one reason behind female underrepresentation in leadership is that female leaders are less effective at coordinating followers' actions. Two experiments using coordination games investigate whether female leaders are less successful than males in persuading followers to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467850

Truthful revelation mechanisms for simultaneous common agency games

Pavan, Alessandro; Calzolari, Giacomo - 2008

This paper considers games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously with the same agent. We introduce a new class of revelation mechanisms that, although it does not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, it facilitates the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266294

Renegotiation of Sales Contracts

Matthews, Steven A. - 1993

Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation … project" to the agent via a sales contract. If only singleton (single-scheme) contracts are feasible, the equilibrium initial … (second-best) efficient allocations. Even when meny (multiple-scheme) contracts are available, if the selection of a scheme …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012235864

Sequential contracting with multiple principals

Calzolariy, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - 2008

-strategy profiles in which the principals offer menus of contracts and delegate to the agent the choice of the contractual terms. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282900

Attention, coordination and bounded recall

Pavan, Alessandro - 2014

I consider a flexible framework of strategic interactions under incomplete information in which, prior to committing their actions (consumption, production, or investment decisions), agents choose the attention to allocate to an arbitrarily large number of information sources about the primitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335452

Information acquisition and welfare

Colombo, Luca; Femminis, Gianluca; Pavan, Alessandro - 2012

and a rich set of externalities that are responsible for possible wedges between the equilibrium and the efficient … with negative production externalities. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352847

Efficient use of information and social value of information

Angeletos, George-Marios; Pavan, Alessandro - 2006

This paper analyzes equlibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies (games) with externalities, strategic … few applications, including production externalities, beauty contests, business cycles, and large Cournot and Bertrand …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282995

The Breakdown of Authority

Frisell, Lars - 2003

This paper studies organizations with autocratic decisionmaking.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005843663

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