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Information independence and common knowledge
Gossner, Olivier; Kalai, Ehud; Weber, Robert - 2009
(statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents' knowledge structure … disassociation under common knowledge (the agents' types are independent, conditional on some common-knowledge variable). Subjective … that disassociates types is more informative than any common-knowledge variable. With three or more agents, conditions (i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282899
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Finite depth of reasoning and equilibrium play in games with incomplete information
Kets, Willemien - 2013
The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an infinite depth of reasoning, which is not always consistent with experimental evidence. This paper generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967-1968) so that players can have a finite depth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352842
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All types naive and canny
Heifetz, Aviad; Kets, Willemien - 2012
This paper constructs a type space that contains all types with a finite depth of reasoning, as well as all types with an infinite depth of reasoning - in particular those types for whom finite-depth types are conceivable, or think that finite-depth types are conceivable in the mind of other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352849
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Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté
Heifetz, Aviad; Kets, Willemien - 2013
In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that if players have an infinite depth of reasoning and this is commonly believed, types generically have a unique rationalizable action in games that satisfy a richness condition. We show that this result does not extend to environments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352864
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Bounded reasoning and higher-order uncertainty
Kets, Willemien - 2012
The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they form beliefs about their opponents' beliefs about their opponents' beliefs and so on, that is, as if players have an infinite depth of reasoning. This strong assumption has nontrivial implications,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282936
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Topologies on types
Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - 2006
We de.ne and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action de.ne the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diþerence between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272319
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Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Eső, Péter; Schummer, James - 2005
In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be unambiguously interpreted as coming from a unique set of Sender-types. This occurs when these types are precisely the ones who gain from deviating for any beliefs the Re-ceiver could form over that set....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273822
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Efficient use of information and social value of information
Angeletos, George-Marios; Pavan, Alessandro - 2006
This paper analyzes equlibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies (games) with externalities, strategic complementarity or substitutability, and heterogenous information. First, we characterize the equilibrium use of information; complementarity heightens the sensitivity of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282995
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Incentive Contracts versus Trust in Three-Person Ultimatum Games- An Experimental Study
Büchner, Susanne; Gonzalez, Luis; Güth, Werner; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002
Whether incentive contracts perform better than trust in terms of productiveefficiency is usually explored by principal-agent experiments (mostinvolving only one agent). We investigate this issue in the context of athree-person ultimatum experiment, which is simpler and more neutrallyframed than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867038
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On the Absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory -A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
Morone, Andrea; Sandri, Serena; Uske, Tobias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006
Theory absorption, a notion introduced by Morgenstern and Schwödiauer (1972)and further elaborated by Güth and Kliemt (2004), discusses the problem whether atheory can survive its own acceptance. Whereas this holds for strategic equilibria accordingto the assumptions on which they are based,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866646