The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they have an infinite depth of reasoning, which is not always consistent with experimental evidence. This paper generalizes the type spaces of Harsanyi (1967-1968) so that players can have a finite depth...

This paper constructs a type space that contains all types with a finite depth of reasoning, as well as all types with an infinite depth of reasoning - in particular those types for whom finite-depth types are conceivable, or think that finite-depth types are conceivable in the mind of other...

In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that if players have an infinite depth of reasoning and this is commonly believed, types generically have a unique rationalizable action in games that satisfy a richness condition. We show that this result does not extend to environments...

The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as if they form beliefs about their opponents' beliefs about their opponents' beliefs and so on, that is, as if players have an infinite depth of reasoning. This strong assumption has nontrivial implications,...

In Bayesian environments with private information, as described by the types of Harsanyi, how can types of agents be (statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents' knowledge structure? Conditions studied are (i) subjective independence...

We de.ne and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action de.ne the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diþerence between...

In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be unambiguously interpreted as coming from a unique set of Sender-types. This occurs when these types are precisely the ones who gain from deviating for any beliefs the Re-ceiver could form over that set....

In the prisoners' dilemma game, the only evolutionary stable strategy is defection, even though nutual cooperation yields a higher payoff. Building on a paper by Robson (1990), we introduce mutants who have the ability to send a (costly) signal, i.e., the "secret handshake," before each round of...

Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient...

In John Nash’s proofs for the existence of (Nash) equilibria basedon Brouwer’s theorem, an iteration mapping is used. A continuous—time analogue of the same mapping has been studied even earlier byBrown and von Neumann. This differential equation has recently beensuggested as a plausible...