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The Efficacy of Tournaments for Non-Routine Team Tasks

Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Grothe, Dominik; … - 2023

also render teams' identity and image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a non … salience of team identity, social image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased salience of team … identity does not improve performance. Social image motivates the top performers. Additional monetary incentives improve all …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467858

Competition and fatigue at work

Angelova, Vera; Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - 2018

We study theoretically and experimentally the role of fatigue and recovery within a competitive work environment. At work, agents usually make their effort choice in response to competition and monetary incentives. At the same time, they have to take into account fatigue, which accumulates over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985278

How Much to Pay in Cash? Employee Retention via Stock Option

Gonzalez, Luis G.; Gurtoviy, Ruslan - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

We model deferred compensation as a share of an uncertain futureprofit granted by a financially constrained employer to her employeein mutual agreement. Deferred compensation serves as a retentionmechanism, helping the employer to avoid bankruptcy. The optimalcombination of cash and deferred...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866781

Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung

Koch, Rosemarie; Stadtmann, Georg - 2010

Wir analysieren das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung. Ferner arbeiten wir einige aufgrund wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Überlegungen zu erwartende Probleme heraus und prognostizieren mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen des Gesetzes. Des Weiteren gehen wir im Rahmen einer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010303781

Stock options and chief executive officer compensation

Armstrong, Christopher S.; Larcker, David F.; Su, Che-Lin - 2007

Although stock options are commonly observed in chief executive o±cer (CEO) compensation contracts, there is theoretical controversy about whether stock options are part of the optimal contract. Using a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we solve an agency model calibrated to the company-specific...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266313

Size Matters - 'Over'investments in a Relational Contracting Setting

Englmaier, Florian; Fahn, Matthias - 2018

The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to over-invest in their companies. A number of theoretical contributions have aimed at explaining this stylized fact, most of them focusing on a fundamental agency problem between shareholders and managers. The present paper shows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932927

Reciprocity in dynamic employment relationships

Fahn, Matthias - 2019

This paper explores the optimal provision of dynamic incentives for employees with reciprocal preferences. Building on the presumption that a relational contract can establish a norm of reciprocity, I show that generous upfront wages that activate an employee's reciprocal preferences are more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290329

The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence From a Field Experiment

Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Schindler, David; … - 2018

Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932936

The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks

Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Grothe, Dominik; … - 2023

Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467847

When Protection Becomes Exploitation: The Impact of Firing Costs on Present-Biased Employees

Englmaier, Florian; Fahn, Matthias; Glogowski, Ulrich; … - 2023

Employment protection harms early-career employees without benefitting them in later career stages (Leonardi and Pica, 2013). We demonstrate that this pattern can result from employers exploiting na¨ıve present-biased employees. Employers offer a dynamic contract with low early-career wages,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467795

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