We analyze social learning and innovation in an overlapping generations model in which available technologies have correlated payoffs. Each generation experiments within a set of policies whose payoffs are initially unknown and drawn from the path of a Brownian motion with drift. Marginal...

This paper investigates the influence of a firm's financial status on the within-firm allocation of funds, reected in its plant-level investment and exit decisions.

Die Frage nach der Kausalität fällt in die Methodologie. Methodologie ist in denWirtschaftswissenschaften ein Bereich, der sowohl bei Ökonomen als auch bei Philosophenkaum Beachtung findet. ....

This paper contributes to the literature by introducing the nexus between financial constraints and thecapital-labour uptake and by considering the capital-labour ratio to overcome the problems that haveplagued investment literature -regarding the investment-cash flow sensitivity of constrained...

Advertisements provide consumers with knowledge about private products, whereas political information is required to provide voters with knowledge of public issues. Modern information technologies and globalization are increasing the exposure of individuals to information. Goods advertising is...

There have been many claims that the Internet represents a nearly frictionless market. This paper extends the empirical results on online retailing by studying prices for nearly homogenous services - holiday packages - matched across conventional and Internet channels. On first sight, lower...

Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players with equal discount factors. We restrict attention to an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous move stage game where actions of player 2 are...

We model a long-run relationship as an infinitely repeated game played by two equally patient agents. In each period, the agents play an extensive-form game of perfect information. There is incomplete information about the type of player 1 while player 2's type is commonly known. We show that a...

We present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse candidates and endorsements are observed by the voters. We show that the equilibrium election outcome is biased towards the experts' interests even though voters know the distribution of expert interests and...

I analyze common agency games in which the principals, and possibly the agent, have private information. I distinguish between games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and games in which they retain some decision power after offering their mechanisms. I show that,...