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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - 2014
uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491315
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Characterizing the Core Via K-Core Covers
Sanchez-Rodriguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ⌊|N |/2⌋-core cover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038137
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Characterizations of Network Power Measures
van den Brink, René; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud; … - 2005
A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325263
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Characterizing the Core via k-Core Covers
Sánchez-Rodríguez, Estela; Borm, Peter; … - 2013
shown that the core of a TU-game coincides with the core of the corresponding minimal rights game. Moreover, the paper … introduces the notion of the k-core cover as an extension of the core cover. The k-core cover of a TU-game consists of all … minimal rights game. It is shown that the core of a TU-game with player set N coincides with the ? …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326133
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Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games and Spillover Stability
Hendrickx, Ruud; Thijssen, Jacco; Borm, Peter - Department of Economics and Related Studies, University … - 2011
This paper discusses minimum cost spanning tree games and argues that the standard approach of using a transferable utility game to come up with a fair allocation of the total costs has some flaws. A new model of spillover games is presented, in which each agent's decision whether or not to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008783905
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Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; … - 2014
merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377244
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Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims
Gächter, Simon; Riedl, Arno - 2003
In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in internationalconflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers hold strong entitlements that are oftengenerated by claims that are not feasible any more. These entitlements seem to considerablyshape negotiation behavior. By using the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324824
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Dividing justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims
Gächter, Simon; Riedl, Arno - 2004
Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people's impartial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325555
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The impact of the menstrual cycle on bargaining behavior
Lozano, Lina; Riedl, Arno; Rott, Christina - 2024
We investigate experimentally how the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes of women. Female participants negotiate in an unstructured bilateral bargaining game with asymmetric information about the allocation of a surplus ('pie size'). We find that the menstrual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014547766
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Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game: Experimental Evidence
Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999
This paper reports the results of experiments involving a 3-personcoalitionformation game with an ultimatumbargaining character. The grand coalition was always the efficientcoalition,whereas the values of the 2-personcoalitions are varied such that they lead to an efficiency loss inthe range...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324594