A critical element in all discounted utility models is the specification of a discount function. We introduce three functions: the delay, speedup and generating functions. Each can be uniquely elicited from behaviour. The delay function determines stationary and the common difference effect. The...

In a critique of the Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) theory of intertemporal choice, al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2006) point out to four errors. One of the alleged errors was that the value function in prospect theory is decreasing. But it is in fact increasing. We provide a correction and a formal...

Two of the anomalies of the exponentially discounted utility model are the 'magnitude effect' (larger magnitudes are discounted less) and the 'sign effect' (a loss is discounted less than a gain of the same magnitude). The literature has followed Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) in attributing the...

We develop a general theory of intertemporal choice: the reference-time theory, RT. RT is a synthesis of ideas from the generalized hyperbolic model (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992), the quasi-hyperbolic model (Phelps and Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997) and subadditivity of time discounting (Roelofsma...

Consider a finite data set where each observation consists of a bundle of contingent consumption chosen from a constraint set of contingent consumption bundles. We develop a general procedure for testing the consistency of such a data set with a broad class of models of choice under risk or...

A critical element in all discounted utility models is the specification of a discount function. We extend the standard model to allow for reference points for both out- comes and time. We consider the axiomatic foundations and properties of two main classes of discount functions. The first, the...

We consider a discounted utility model that has two components. (1) The instan- taneous utility is of the prospect theory form, thus, allowing for reference dependent outcomes. (2) The discount function embodies a ‘reference time’ to which all future outcomes are discounted back to, hence,...

We focus on four stylized facts of behavior under risk. Decision makers: (1) Overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities. (2) Ignore events of extremely low probability and treat extremely high probability events as certain. (3) Buy inadequate insurance for very low...

Evidence shows that (i) people overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities, but (ii) ignore events of extremely low probability and treat extremely high probability events as certain. The main alternative decision theories, rank dependent utility (RDU) and cumulative prospect...

Since Kahneman and Tversky (1979), it has been generally recognized that decision makers overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities. Of the several weighting functions that have been proposed, that of Prelec (1998) has the attractions that it is parsimonious, consistent with...