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In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm

Ehlers, Lars H. - In: Games and economic behavior 48 (2004) 2, pp. 249-270

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002144533

Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities

Kumano, Taro - In: Games and economic behavior 104 (2017), pp. 230-240

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793356

Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness

Meisner, Vincent - 2021

Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648382

Everyone likes to be liked : experimental evidence from matching markets

Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476792

Reciprocal preferences in matching markets

Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023 - This version: February 2023

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478421