Similar Search Results

The scholarship assignment problem

Amorós, Pablo; Corchón, Luis C.; Moreno, Bernardo - In: Games and economic behavior 38 (2002) 1, pp. 1-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001645922

Implementation in the many-to-many matching market

Sotomayor, Marilda - In: Games and economic behavior 46 (2004) 1, pp. 199-212

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001884315

Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities

Kumano, Taro - In: Games and economic behavior 104 (2017), pp. 230-240

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793356

Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness

Meisner, Vincent - 2021

Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648382

Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions

Milgrom, Paul - In: Games and economic behavior 70 (2010) 1, pp. 62-70

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009242484

Fair procedures with naive agents : who wants the Boston mechanism?

König, Tobias; Kübler, Dorothea; Mechtenberg, Lydia; … - 2019

the assortative matching. We compare the preferences of stakeholders who know their own role with agents behind the veil … vote for the assortative matching otherwise. This is in line with the model of Pathak and Sönmez (2008). Subjects behind … the mechanism are split in their vote for the Boston mechanism and the assortative matching. According to the spectators …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012139539