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Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648382
Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … them. Through a pre-registered and theory-guided laboratory experiment, we provide evidence that such reciprocal … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476792
paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …
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Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138798
Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...
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