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Deterministic versus stochastic contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model
Mettral, Thomas - 2018
I show that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and an agent are always at least as profitable to the … correlation of stochastic contracts across periods that the usual restriction in the literature to deterministic contracts is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011901976
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Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations
Lang, Matthias - 2022
Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous … literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic … contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This paper studies incentive contracts with stochastic compensation, like …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014458796
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Human Resource Management and productivity
Bloom, Nicholas; Van Reenen, John - 2010
"In this handbook of labor economics chapter we examine the relationship between Human Resource Management (HRM) and productivity. HRM includes incentive pay (individual and group) as well as many non-pay aspects of the employment relationship such as matching (hiring and firing) and work...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003969411
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Arbeitsrechtliche Hemmnisse für die Anreizwirkung flexibler Entgeltsysteme
Oechsler, Walter A. - 2001
Wage flexibility is often considered to be caused by the highly regulated labor market and the rigid system of labor law existing in Germany, especially in the field of wage determination. In this paper the impact of existing labor agreements on incentive systems in Germany is analyzed. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013428402
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Subjective evaluation versus public information
Bester, Helmut; Münster, Johannes - 2013
This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752336
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Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation
Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429934
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Misappropriation of R&D subsidies : estimating treatment effects with one-sided noncompliance
Boeing, Philipp; Peters, Bettina - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012818352
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The gatekeeper's dilemma : political selection or team effort
Fiva, Jon H.; Izzo, Federica; Tukiainen, Janne - 2024
Political parties play a crucial gatekeeping role in elections, including controlling electoral resources, candidate recruitment, and electoral list compositions. In making these strategic choices, parties aim to encourage candidates to invest in the campaign, while also trying to secure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014465029
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Facility management services in UK hospitals : in-house or outsourcing
Podaneva, Alena; Picard, Pierre M. - 2023
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014472577
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Misappropriation of R&D subsidies : estimating treatment effects with one-sided noncompliance
Boeing, Philipp; Peters, Bettina - 2021
In evaluating the effectiveness of R&D subsidies, the literature has focused on potential crowding out effects, while the possibility of misappropriation of public funds that results from moral hazard behavior has been completely neglected. This study develops a theoretical framework with which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012661468