Showing 1 - 10 of 300
This paper experimentally studies two simple interventions aimed at increasing public goods provision in settings in which accurate feedback about contributions is not available. The first intervention aims to exploit lying aversion by requiring subjects to send a non-verifiable ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011982104
We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014487322
International climate negotiations have so far failed to produce ambitious climate cooperation. We combine laboratory experiments with simulations to investigate the performance of two negotiation design features to address this failure: The Paris Agreement's ratchet-up mechanism, which requires...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271325
Volunteering is a widespread allocation mechanism in the workplace. It emerges naturally in software development or the generation of online knowledge platforms. Using a field experiment with more than 2000 workers, we study the effect of team size on volunteering in an online labor market. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411312
In this paper, we investigate whether dynamic incentive schemes lead to a ratchet effect in a social dilemma. We test whether subjects strategically restrict their contribution levels at the beginning of a cumulative public goods game in order to avoid high obligations in the future and how this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012196294
We experimentally test a theoretically promising amendment to the ratchet-up mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The ratchet-up mechanism prescribes that parties’ commitments to the global response to climate change cannot decrease over time and our results confirm that its effect is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013460308
We study the efficacy of rebate rules in reward-based crowdfunding, where a project is only realized when a funding goal is met, and only those who pledge at least a reservation price receive a reward from the project. We propose and experimentally test two rebate rules against the customary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014479171
We study coalitional one-deviation principle in a framework a la Chwe (1994). The principle requires that an active coalition or any of its subcoalition will not benefit from a single deviation to a strategy that specifies, for each history of coalitional moves, an active coalition and its move....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012502989
Following the notion that organizations often face public good dilemmas when collective action is needed, we use a real-time provision-point mechanism to experimentally explore the process of achieving cooperative equilibria. Specifically, besides exploring group outcomes, we identify individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900072
We analyze cooperation within a company setting in order to study the relationship between cooperative attitudes and financial as well as non-financial rewards. In total, 910 employees of a large software company participate in an incentivized online experiment. We observe high levels of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236842