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We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752337
This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set of implementable social choice functions (SCF) and associated payoff vectors. Any SCF and any payoff profile that are implementable if the supervisor's information was public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011902729
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
We use a model with agency frictions to analyze the structure of a dealer market that faces competition from a crossing network. Traders are privately informed about their types (e.g. their portfolios), which is something the dealer must take into account when engaging his counterparties....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705180
Combining a theoretical model of imperfect information with empirical evidence, we show how the effect of providing price information to consumers depends on how well informed they are beforehand. Theoretically, an increase in consumer information decreases prices more, the fewer ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495802
We introduce consumers with intrinsic privacy preferences into the monopolistic non-linear pricing model. Next to classical consumers, there is a share of data-sensitive consumers who incur a privacy cost if their purchase reveals information to the monopolist. The monopolist discriminates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191335
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003576594
We analyze a relational contracting problem, in which the principal has private information about the future value of the relationship. In order to reduce bonus payments, the principal is tempted to claim that the value of the future relationship is lower than it actually is. To induce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011904802