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The efficacy of tournaments for non-routine team tasks

Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Grothe, Dominik; … - 2023

also render teams' identity and image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a non … salience of team identity, social image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased salience of team … identity does not improve performance. Social image motivates the top performers. Additional monetary incentives improve all …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495030

Competition and fatigue at work

Angelova, Vera; Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - 2018

We study theoretically and experimentally the role of fatigue and recovery within a competitive work environment. At work, agents usually make their effort choice in response to competition and monetary incentives. At the same time, they have to take into account fatigue, which accumulates over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976073

Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance?

Angelova, Vera; Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - 2017

If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895040

Reciprocity in dynamic employment relationships

Fahn, Matthias - 2019

This paper explores the optimal provision of dynamic incentives for employees with reciprocal preferences. Building on the presumption that a relational contract can establish a norm of reciprocity, I show that generous upfront wages that activate an employee’s reciprocal preferences are more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126237

Size matters : "over"investments in a relational contracting setting

Englmaier, Florian; Fahn, Matthias - 2018

The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to over-invest in their companies. A number of theoretical contributions have aimed at explaining this stylized fact, most of them focusing on a fundamental agency problem between shareholders and managers. The present paper shows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895831

The effect of incentives in non-routine analytical team tasks : evidence from a field experiment

Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Schindler, David; … - 2018

Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899201

The effect of incentives in non-routine analytical team tasks

Englmaier, Florian; Grimm, Stefan; Grothe, Dominik; … - 2023

Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014487148

When protection becomes exploitation : the impact of firing costs on present-biased employees

Englmaier, Florian; Fahn, Matthias; Glogowski, Ulrich; … - 2023

Employment protection harms early-career employees without benefitting them in later career stages (Leonardi and Pica, 2013). We demonstrate that this pattern can result from employers exploiting na¨ıve present-biased employees. Employers offer a dynamic contract with low early-career wages,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476854

Long-term employment relations when agents are present biased

Englmaier, Florian; Fahn, Matthias; Schwarz, Marco A. - 2017

We analyze how agents' present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite-horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a virtual contract - which agents plan to choose in the future - and a real contract which they end up...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591480

Delegating pricing power to customers : pay what you want or name your own price?

Krämer, Marius-Florentin; Schmidt, Klaus M.; Spann, Martin - 2017

Pay What You Want (PWYW) and Name Your Own Price (NYOP) are customer driven pricing mechanisms that give customers (some) pricing power. Both have been used in service industries with high fixed costs to price discriminate without setting a reference price. Their participatory and innovative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591510

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