This paper studies allocations that can be implemented by an arbitrator subject to the constraint that the agents' outside option is to start bargaining by themselves. As the population becomes large, the set of implementable allocations shrinks to a singleton point - the conflict-free...

Often preferences of agents are such that any sensible goal of the collective must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design demand that in this case all alternatives are equilibrium outcomes of the social choice mechanism. However, as far as the idea of...

Die Einführung neuer Technologien stellt für Organisationen mit hoher Zuverlässigkeit (HROs) oder solche die danach streben (RSOs) eine erhebliche Herausforderung dar. Die vorliegende Arbeit analysiert die mit diesem Prozess verbundenen Herausforderungen, insbesondere in Hinblick auf...